Revisiting the Porter hypothesis: an empirical analysis of green innovation in the Netherlands by van Leeuwen, G.M.J. & Mohnen, P.
  
 
Revisiting the Porter hypothesis: an empirical analysis
of green innovation in the Netherlands
Citation for published version (APA):
van Leeuwen, G. M. J., & Mohnen, P. (2013). Revisiting the Porter hypothesis: an empirical analysis of
green innovation in the Netherlands. (UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series; No. 002). Maastricht: UNU-
MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2013
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
  
 
  
 
 
 
#2013-002 
 
Revisiting the porter hypothesis:  
An empirical analysis of green innovation for the Netherlands 
George van Leeuwen and Pierre Mohnen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU‐MERIT) 
email: info@merit.unu.edu | website: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) 
email: info‐governance@maastrichtuniversity.nl | website: http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu 
 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499 
Working Paper Series 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, 
UNU-MERIT 
 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance  
MGSoG 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at UNU-MERIT and MGSoG to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 
 
1 
 
REVISITING THE PORTER HYPOTHESIS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF GREEN INNOVATION FOR THE NETHERLANDS 
 
George van Leeuwen1 and Pierre Mohnen2  
 
Summary:  
Almost all empirical research that has attempted to assess the validity of the Porter hypothe-
sis has started from reduced-form models, e.g. by using single-equation models for estimat-
ing the contribution of environmental regulation (ER) to productivity. This paper addresses 
the Porter Hypothesis within a structural approach that allows us to test what is known in 
the literature as the “weak” and the “strong” version of the Porter hypothesis. Our “Green 
Innovation” model includes three types of eco investments and non-eco R&D to explain 
differences in the incidence of innovation. Besides product and process innovations we rec-
ognize eco-innovation as a separate type of innovation output. We explicitly model the poten-
tial synergies of introducing the three types of innovations simultaneously and their synergy 
in affecting total factor productivity (TFP) performance. Using a comprehensive panel of 
firm-level data built from four surveys we aim to estimate the relative importance of energy 
price incentives as a market based type of ER and the direct effect of environmental regula-
tion on eco investment and firms’ decisions regarding the introduction of several types of 
innovations. The results of our analysis show a strong corroboration of the weak version of 
the Porter hypothesis but not of the strong version of the PH, in this case on TFP perform-
ance. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between technological change and environmental policy has 
received a lot of attention from scholars and policymakers during the last decades. 
This is partly because the environmental consequences of social and business activ-
ity are affected by the rate and direction of technological change, and also because 
environmental policy interventions may create new constraints and incentives that 
may shape the path of future technological development (Jaffe et al., 2003).  
Environmental technological progress is a very broad phenomenon and every 
description of it cannot be more than very incomplete. Some examples concern 1) 
technologies that reduce pollution at the end-of-pipe, such as scrubbers for use on 
industrial smokestacks or catalytic converters for automobiles 2) technologies that 
increase user value for consumer products (e.g. medicines) after introducing new 
production methods, which, at the same time, decrease the environmental burden of 
their production by using materials that are less harmful for the environment and 3) 
implementation of technologies that are targeted to changes in production processes 
to improve energy efficiency.  
Policy responses to environmental problems often start from the assertion that 
the link between overall technological change and (e.g.) climate based environ-
mental policies is merely macro oriented. However, for understanding the interac-
tion between environmental policy and technology it also makes sense to go down to 
the micro level. After all, environmental regulation and public funding of R&D are 
the first impetus to have more green technologies developed by individual firms. 
Similar to other types of innovations, the benefits of environmental technological 
innovations may accrue to society at large rather than to the adopter of these new 
technologies alone. This market failure related to innovation in general is pivotal to 
the numerous discussions surrounding the so-called Porter-Hypothesis (PH).   
It is often argued (see e.g. Wagner, 2003) that one cannot find a 10-Dollar bill 
on the ground, because if it was there, somebody else would already have picked it 
up. This metaphor neglects three things 1) that market forces alone do not provide 
enough incentives for firms to be engaged in green innovation and 2) that green 
innovation is not very different compared to innovation in general and 3) that policy 
responses such as environmental regulation have a role to play to bring economic 
opportunity in line with the environment (see e.g. Jaffe et al., 2002, Desrochers, 
2008 and Cerin, 2012). The central issue is the question whether regulation drives 
innovation. The PH asserts that polluting firms can benefit from environmental poli-
cies, arguing that well designed and stringent environmental regulation (ER) can 
stimulate innovations, which in turn increase the productivity of firms or the product 
value for end users (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). The message of 
this hypothesis is that there seems to be no trade-off between economic growth and 
environmental protection but a win-win situation instead. Environmental regulation 
would benefit both society and regulated firms by triggering dynamic efficiency of 
firms and these benefits may partially or fully offset the costs of complying with 
environmental restrictions.  
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The empirical evidence available supporting the Porter Hypothesis seems to 
be rather scanty and in most cases the PH is rejected by the data (see e.g. Wagner 
(2003), Popp et al. (2010), Ambec and Barla (2006), and Ambec et al. (2011) for an 
extended review). For the Netherlands the evidence seems to be very scarce. This 
paper tries to shed a new light on the PH by using a rich unbalanced panel con-
structed by matching Dutch firm level data from four surveys and by modelling the 
complementarities of eco-innovation with traditional modes of innovation. 
As argued by Kriegel and Ziesemer (2009), the main problem regarding the 
empirical testing of the PH, in essence, boils down to having a better understanding 
of the (eco) innovation adoption decisions of firms. This assertion asks for a struc-
tural modeling approach in investing the contribution of energy prices and environ-
mental regulations on green investment and of green investment on innovation and 
productive efficiency. We will embark on this task by adopting a Green CDM (Cré-
pon-Duguet-Mairesse) type of model for the Netherlands, similar to the Lanoie, 
Laurent-Lucchetti, Johnstone and Ambec (2011) model, that allows testing what 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) have called the “weak” version and the “strong” version of 
the PH, referring to the effect of environmental regulations on respectively environ-
mental innovations and economic performance, in this case total factor productivity 
(TFP).  Contrary to Cainelli et al. (2010) our model includes several types of eco 
investments and regards eco innovation as a special mode of innovation output. Eco, 
environmental and green innovation will be interchangeably used, indicating each 
time an innovation with a lower environmental impact. Likewise eco, environmental 
and green investment all point to investments aimed at reducing the environmental 
burden of production (for more discussion on the definition, see Kemp (2011)). 
Our starting point of investigation of the PH is the impact of energy prices on 
different types of eco investment. The fact that carbon taxes are a substantial part of 
gross energy prices makes them a potentially useful instrument for environmental 
policy aimed at improving the energy related static as well as dynamic efficiency of 
firms. In particular, this may be the case if such price incentives invoke environ-
mental investment combined with the renewing of the production process (so-called 
process integrated eco investment).  
Our empirical model starts from the estimation of four innovation input equa-
tions: two for R&D (eco R&D and other R&D) and two for other types of eco-
investments, end-of-pipe and process integrated respectively. Subsequently, we use 
the predictions from these equations for modeling the incidence of different types of 
innovation. At the end, we will estimate a labour productivity equation and test for 
complementarity or substitutability of different innovation strategies in affecting the 
total factor productivity (TFP). 
A novelty of our paper is to try and assess the existence of complementarities 
(as defined in Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and 1995) between product, process and 
eco innovations. We distinguish complementarities in the incidence of innovation 
and in their effects on productivity performance. To estimate the structural model 
we have implemented a procedure proposed by Lewbel (2007) for solving the co-
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herency and incompleteness problem when estimating a system of equations with 
dummy endogenous variables.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 an overview of the literature 
is given.  Section 3 discusses the model used in the empirical application and section 
4 elaborates on the econometric issues of this research. Thereafter the data are pre-
sented in section 5, followed by a discussion of the main results in section 6. Section 
7 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
One can hardly find any branch of economics that has been concerned with 
the PH as much as environmental economics. There is a vast body of literature de-
voted to appraise or peruse the seminal contributions of Porter (1991) and Porter and 
van der Linde (1995). Originating primarily from empirical regularities found in the 
analysis of cross-country differences in the stringency of environmental regulation 
and economic performance, the hypothesis has triggered a lot of research both theo-
retical and empirical in nature. The Porter hypothesis has been criticized, for being 
merely based on anecdotal stories (which in some cases seem to be even erroneous) 
and for the lack of a sound theoretical basis (see e.g. Palmer et al., 1995, and Cerin, 
2006).  
More recent research attempts to fill the gap between empirics and theory to 
provide a theoretical underpinning of the PH. Mohr (2002) argues that it is a feasible 
outcome if one allows for the possibility of endogenous technical change. More 
recent theoretical contributions that link the environment to endogenous growth are 
given in Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Gans (2012). Ambec and Barla (2002) raise the 
question whether regulation is indeed needed for firms to adopt profit-increasing 
innovations, and pointing amongst others to the 10-Dollar metaphor mentioned 
above. This last criticism is targeted to the primitive of the PH stating that firms 
systematically ignore opportunities for profit increasing innovations and that envi-
ronmental regulation can motivate firms to capture “low hanging fruit” offered by 
environmental challenges to their businesses. Another source is the literature of be-
haviour economics. This literature offers several explanations for underinvesting in 
environmental innovation (see e.g. Ambec and Barla, 2006, for examples).  
Similarly, several theoretical attempts have tried to frame regulation in mod-
els often used for analysing the interaction between competition and innovation. A 
recent example is given in Constantatos and Hermann (2011). The example concerns 
the introduction of organic products in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing. By avoiding 
the use of environmentally damaging fertilizers there is less environmental burden 
as well as more user value created because organic drugs are healthier. In this case a 
win-win situation between regulation and innovation is not self-evident because 
there is much scope for conjectural variation, especially if such innovations take 
place in markets that are characterized by fierce competition and because the envi-
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ronmental quality of the new product will be highly correlated with other product 
attributes. The latter argument explains why inertia at the consumer side of the mar-
ket may enlarge the risk of investing due to potential first-mover disadvantages. 
The example illustrates that there are many similarities with the traditional 
view on the relationship between innovation and competition as a source of underin-
vesting in innovation. Moreover, the example also shows that the scope for envi-
ronmental policies is very broad in principle, but that it is questionable how envi-
ronmental regulation can offer a solution to the problems involved. This brings us to 
another strand of research that focuses on the second primitive of the PH, i.e. the 
assertion that environmental regulations should be well designed and stringent 
enough to be successful also from an economic point of view. 
An assessment of the instruments of environmental regulation and a judgment 
of their effectiveness can be found in Wagner (2003). The myriad of environmental 
instruments can be better understood when using a classification or typology. A first 
delineation is between command and control type regulation and market based regu-
lation. The instruments that set emission limits and standards fall into the first class 
and are often labelled “end of pipe” regulations. Environmental taxes and charges 
and tradable emission permits or certificates are examples of the second class of 
instruments.  
Environmental effectiveness can be defined as the ability to achieve a prede-
fined environmental target. The general view is that this definition is more appropri-
ate for the first class of instruments. By contrast, the second class of instruments has 
a higher economic profile, because they are aimed at triggering static and dynamic 
efficiency and internalizing environmental externalities in and between markets. In 
particular these instruments play a role in the empirical testing of the premises of the 
PH. 
Looking at the empirical evidence provided in the literature it can be con-
cluded that the picture is rather mixed. The number of papers and articles that have 
put the PH to the empirical testing is overwhelming but they do not to lead to a gen-
eral consensus. Much of this has to do with the different research strategies and the 
availability of data. Compared to empirical evidence at the macro or industry level, 
the number of papers that use firm level data is rather scarce. Besides that, research 
is targeted at different measures of performance.  
Cutting through different reviews of empirical work it can be concluded that 
much research is aimed at investigating the impact of environmental regulation on 
productivity or productive efficiency in a reduced form estimation approach. In 
many cases this type of research leads to the conclusion that environmental regula-
tion has a negative impact on productivity. This conclusion can be easily under-
stood, because regulation forces firms to invest in the environment and this increases 
production costs of firms to comply with the environmental restrictions.  
There are several issues at stake here. If these investments do not lead to re-
newing of production processes then there is no reason for expecting substantial 
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gains in resource efficiency. A second issue is related to measurement. “End-of-
pipe” investments may reduce pollution but this reduction is not accounted for in 
output. The same capital and other inputs produce two types of output: bad and good 
output and it is hardly possible to value the contribution of (reducing) bad output. 
This raises serious problems when investigating the relation between environmental 
regulation and (productive) efficiency.1 An interesting solution to circumvent this 
problem is presented in Domazlicky and Weber (2004). They use volume data on 
toxic releases and traditional output measures such as real value added in a non-
parametric analysis to identify technical change from efficiency change. However, 
these results also lead to the conclusion that the impact of regulation on total factor 
productivity (TFP) is negative.2 
More interesting for the PH is the research that looks into the impact of envi-
ronmental regulation on innovation. This type of research seems to be a necessary if 
not sufficient condition for the PH. Again the evidence is scanty and weak in gen-
eral. Notable examples of this type of research can be found in several papers and 
articles of ZEW. In most cases the research uses the data collected on innovation 
and regulation in the Mannheim Innovation Panel that is constructed from several 
editions of the German Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The focus of research 
varies between regulation driven innovation alone (Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2010) 
to the impact of regulation driven innovation on competitiveness (Rennings and 
Rammer, 2010), employment dynamics (Horbach and Rennings, 2012) or profitabil-
ity (Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2011). Support for the PH is provided by concluding 
that environmental regulation does not harm competitiveness  (Rennings and Ram-
mer, 2010) and that the contribution of regulation induced innovation to profitability 
is larger than the contribution of other (more) voluntary innovations (Rexhäuser and 
Rammer, 2011). 
Ideally, a thorough empirical testing of the PH requires data on which types of 
regulations trigger which innovations at the firm level. The most recent edition of 
CIS contains new questions on environmental innovation. However, for the Nether-
lands, this new module cannot be used to identify the role of different instruments of 
environmental regulation properly. The only variable available on regulation in this 
research concerns firm responses to environmental regulation in general, either ex-
isting or anticipated regulations. By contrast, the German CIS allows a distinction 
between types of environmental regulations. After matching the firm responses with 
external data on the age of regulations, Rennings and Rexhäuser (2010) also investi-
gated the long-term impact of different types of regulation on the adoption of envi-
ronmental innovation. To keep things tractable, they made a distinction between 
three types of environmental regulation (ER): a) “end-of-pipe” regulation, b) circu-
lar flow economy regulation and c) climate change based regulations. An important 
conclusion is that the long-term impact of regulation only triggers innovation that is 
strongly related to “control type” ER. By contrast, the support for PH in terms of 
                                                     
1 This problem is well recognized by statisticians and environmental accounting is an important avenue 
for National Accounts. See Muller et al. (2011) for a recent contribution to this problem.   
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increasing static or dynamic efficiency is limited. As convincingly argued by Ren-
nings and Rexhäuser (2010), the contribution of control type ER to dynamic effi-
ciency is expected to be limited, as, once installed, “end-of pipe” environmental 
investment cannot contribute to the innovation process anymore.  
One can add to this that other types of ecological investment may yield higher 
returns to investment. Combining eco investment with renewing of production proc-
esses seems a better example of innovation related eco investment. We take this 
consideration into account in the next section. 
3. A Green CDM type empirical model 
The empirical model used in this paper is a modified version of the so-called 
“CDM model”. Today, this model is the work horse for research on innovation when 
using firm-level data (see Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse, 1998). A graphical presen-
tation of our model is given in Figure 1.3 The upper part of the figure points to the 
investment decision stage. In the traditional CDM model this concerns the decision 
on how much to invest in R&D. In this paper we face another investment decision 
problem, i.e. namely whether or not to invest in order to reduce the environmental 
burden of the firm’s operations. In section 3.1 we will discuss the specification of 
the input stage of the model. The second block of the model describes innovation a 
separate production process with R&D and eco-investment as an input and knowl-
edge creation, in the form of new products, new production processes and eco-
innovation as the outcomes.  
The third block examines the link between innovation outputs and productiv-
ity as a measure of economic performance. We shall now describe each block in 
detail.  
                                                                                                                                         
2 The method used is the “directional output distance approach” developed by Chung et al. (2007) for 
constructing the Malmquist-Luneberger index to decompose (changes in) TFP.  
3 The figure is adapted version of the one presented in Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998). 
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3.1 The investment decisions 
 
We consider four investment decisions: three decisions concerning types of 
eco investment and one concerning investment in non-eco R&D. Eco investment 
(X1) is comprised of 1) eco R&D, 2) eco investment in end-of-pipe facilities, and 3) 
eco investment that is “process integrated”, i.e. eco investment combined with the 
renewal of the main production processes of the firm. The investment inputs into 
non-eco innovation (X2) are defined as gross expenditures in R&D less expenditures 
in eco R&D. Irrespective of which type of investment is concerned, we assume that 
firms first decide whether to invest or not and then choose the investment intensity. 
Firms will invest in each of these types of investment if the latent value of investing 
exceeds some threshold value c . For example, for X1, this can be expressed as fol-
lows: 
 
11 iDX if 1111*1 cZDX iii   , and     
          (1) 
01 iDX if 1111*1 cZDX iii   . 
 
The vector Zi1 in (1) collects the variables that are assumed to determine the selec-
tion of firms that invest in X1, i.e. the occurrence of having performed and reported 
eco investment of the type considered. In a similar way we can model the decision 
concerning non-eco R&D investment (DXi2).   
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Model (1) is extended with a set of equations that models the level of invest-
ment intensity for each of the three types of eco investment and for non-eco R&D. 
For example, for some type of eco investment, this yields 
111
*
11 iiii eXXX    if 11 iDX , and    
          (2) 
01 iX    if .01 iDX  
Models (1) and (2) are applied to each of the four types of innovation invest-
ment. Assuming a bivariate normal distribution for 1  and 1e  (in case of a specific 
type of eco investment), and similarly for 2  and 2e (in case of non-eco R&D in-
vestment), the system (1) - (2) is a Tobit II type selection model (Amemiya,1984).  
3.2 Implementing the investment models 
Although we are dealing in each case with a general investment problem, one 
can imagine that the four types of investment are rather distinct. The traditional view 
is that expenditures on non-eco R&D have a higher economic profile, and that such 
expenditures are quite different from eco investment (including eco R&D) when 
judged from the point of the strategies of the firms. This is in particular the case if 
we compare eco investment performed to comply with “control type” environmental 
regulation with R&D that is aimed at developing new goods.  
Not at least because of the difficulty of evaluating the output of “bad goods” 
or of “process integrated” eco investment, which, by definition aims at reducing bad 
output and increasing resource efficiency,  it is impossible to use standard capital 
and investment theory to derive formal investment models. At least, we consider 
such an exercise beyond the scope of this research. To a lesser extent the same prob-
lems also carries over to “process integrated” eco investment, which, by definition 
aims at reducing bad output while increasing resource efficiency. Likewise for in-
vestment in non-eco R&D, we miss the necessary price data to estimate an invest-
ment equation that would be embedded in capital and investment theory. For both 
eco-and non-eco investments we have information on subsidies received that can be 
used for explaining differences in investment intensities between firms. The R&D 
subsidies are not the only incentives for eco R&D (and investment). Internalizing 
environmental externalities can also be achieved via energy prices. As mentioned 
before, energy prices are an interesting instrument of market based ER. A nice fea-
ture of the data is that we can construct firm-specific marginal energy prices to ex-
plain differences in each type of eco investment. This brings us to the specification 
of the vectors Z and X in (1) and (2) for non-eco R&D innovation investment and for 
the three types of eco investment respectively.  
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3.2.1 Non-eco R&D investment 
For the selectivity and intensity equations non-eco R&D investment (Z2 and 
X2 respectively), we introduce the same explanatory variables as in Polder et al. 
(2010). Z2 includes the begin-of-period size (Z21), a dummy indicating whether the 
firm belongs to an enterprise group (Z22), a dummy to indicate whether firms are 
involved in innovation cooperation (Z23) or are dependent on foreign markets (Z24), a 
dummy variable that indicates whether firms responded to ER or not (Z25), a set of 
industry dummies (Z26) and a two dummy variables indicating the importance of 
“demand-pull” and “cost-push” objectives for innovation (Z27  - Z 28): 
 
Z2 = {Z21, Z22, Z23, Z24, Z25, Z26, Z27, Z28}. 
 
The probability to invest in non-environmental R&D is supposed to increase with 
size and to be higher for firms that belong to a group, that cooperate for innovation, 
that operate on foreign markets, that are subject to environmental regulations and 
that are driven by cost-push or demand-pull considerations. Those same variables 
are assumed to affect the intensity of non-eco R&D, i.e. are collected in the vector 
X2, with the exception of the innovation cooperation dummy (Z23) and with the addi-
tion of subsidies received from local authorities, government bodies and the EU (X21 
- X23) and a set of time dummies (X24). Hence we have  
 
X2 = {Z21, Z22, Z24, Z25, Z26, X21, X22, X23, X24}. 
3.2.2 Eco investment 
In principle, some of the variables used for modeling other innovation invest-
ment could also be used for the eco investment equations (Z1 and X1). However, this 
would lead to a considerable loss of data at the outset because of the small overlap 
of the data of the four surveys that would have to be matched (see section 5). To 
minimize the lack of data coverage between surveys, we focus on the variables that 
are collected in two surveys: the Production Statistics survey (PS) and the survey on 
environmental costs of firms (ECF). The use of ECF is imperative here. It is this 
survey that collects data on the three types of eco investment. Combining these with 
data on energy costs and volumes collected in the PS-survey allows us to construct 
(gross) marginal energy prices (pegt) for the firms for which data on eco investment 
are available.4 In this way, and after using a measure for the prices of eco investment 
                                                     
4 For a much smaller sample (obtained after matching also the “Energy Use Survey” (ES)) we can 
decompose gross marginal energy prices as follows:
 
),1( ntntntntgt stepetepepe   
where pent is the marginal energy price net of taxes, tent the marginal energy tax and stent the ratio of 
marginal energy tax over marginal energy prices net of taxes. Constructing this variable is only possi-
ble for the intersection of ES and PS data. Matching this intersection with the CIS and ECF data leads 
to a considerable loss of data.  
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collected in the ECF survey (pit), we obtain a measure for the relative price of eco 
investment (relative to energy prices) 
).ln()ln(11 gtt pepiX    
Furthermore, and to determine the importance of ER for eco investment, we 
include an environmental regulation (ER) dummy (X12). The model is “completed” 
further by using the logarithm of beginning-of-period energy cost shares (X13), the 
logarithm of beginning-of-period size (X14), a dummy variable that indicates whether 
firms received eco subsidies (X15), and a set of industry and year dummies (X16): 
 
X1 = {X11, … , X16}. 
 
Finally, we take into account that selectivity may be dependent on the responses to 
ER (X12), on the (pre-existing) energy intensity (X13), on firm size (X14), on the im-
portance of (pre-existing) environmental levies (X17) and on a set of industry dum-
mies (X18): 
 
Z1 = { X12, X13, X14, X17, X18}. 
3.3 Innovation output 
The middle part of figure 1 indicates that innovation investment leads to in-
novation output. We consider three types of innovation output: product -, process - 
and eco innovation. We observe dichotomous variables indicating whether a certain 
innovation has been adopted or not. The three types of innovation are likely to be 
interrelated in the sense that the return to a certain type of innovation could depend 
on the adoption of the other innovations for reasons of complementarity or substitut-
ability between them. It is well documented in the econometric literature (see e.g. 
Heckman, 1978, Tamer, 2003, Lewbel, 2007) that the estimation of a trivariate pro-
bit with endogenous dummy variables raises severe problems of identification. 
There can be no solution (in which case the system is said to be incoherent) or mul-
tiple solutions (in which case it is said to be incomplete). The empirical literature 
offers several solutions to this problem. In general, these solutions boil down to im-
posing zero restrictions on the coefficients of some of the binary endogenous ex-
planatory variables or by relying on recursive or triangular systems in which one of 
the choices is assumed to be leading (see for a discussion of completeness and co-
herency section 2 of Tamer (2003)). One way to avoid incoherency and incomplete-
ness is to start from a McFadden (1973) solution by considering a multinomial 
choice problem based on a random utility model. This framework has been proposed 
more recently by Lewbel (2007) and adapted by Miravete and Pernías (2006) and 
Kretschmer, Miravete and Pernías (2012). 
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Let the total utility (in this case profit) be 
 ),,( 321 yyyVV          
 1131321211 )( yyyx                  (3) 
 2232312122 )( yyyx        
 .)( 3323213133 yyyx       
The dichotomous variables for the three types of innovation are given by 
).3,2,1( iyi  There are in total eight possible combinations of innovation choices 
yielding respectively the following profit outcomes:   
0)0,0,0( V          (3a) 
333)1,0,0(   xV                   (3b)    
222)0,1,0(   xV                   (3c) 
3232233322 )()1,1,0(   xxV               (3d) 
111)0,0,1(   xV                   (3e) 
3131133311 )()1,0,1(   xxV                (3f) 
2121122211 )()0,1,1(   xxV                (3g) 
332211)1,1,1( xxxV         
      .)()()( 321322331132112      (3h) 
The “complementarity parameters” ij and ji  are placed in parenthesis be-
cause only the sums can be identified.5 If 0 jiij   )0( , the corresponding 
pair of innovations are complements (substitutes). The model is complete because 
(latent) profitability is specified for all possible strategies and coherent because 
every strategy should have a latent profit that exceeds the profits of all other strate-
gies. As pointed out by Lewbel (2007), the difference with respect to the traditional 
multinomial choice framework is that we do not have a separate specification for 
V(1,1,1) such as 33X  but instead we use (3h) derived from the model for the total 
latent profit function. To our knowledge this model has not been put to the empirical 
testing for more than two strategies because of computational difficulties. We refer 
                                                     
5 Notice that if the ij ’s are equal to zero, we are in the presence of a trivariate Probit model. Methods 
for estimating such models are readily available (see Capellari and Jenkins (2003, 2006) and Train 
(2003)).  
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to Annex B for a more detailed account of the empirical implementation. 
The si ' are random errors that are jointly normally distributed. 
The profitability of pursuing a particular innovation iy depends on the adop-
tion of the other innovation modes, through the “complementarity parameters”, and 
on a certain number of variables summarized in .ix  It also depends on the non-eco 
R&D and the three types of eco-investments. It is, indeed, interesting to find out 
which investments affect which types of innovation and do enter as explanatory 
variables in the innovation equations. For this reason we use the predictions of the 
latent variables of the investment equations estimated in the first step: 
,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ *13
*
12
*
11 XXX  the predictions for the three types of eco investment, and ,ˆ
*
2X  the 
prediction for non-eco R&D. Furthermore, ix  contains C is a vector of control vari-
ables (e.g. industry and time dummies) and especially Dreg, the environmental regu-
lation dummy, which captures whether firms respond to either existing or antici-
pated ER. Thus, besides the possible influence of ER on (eco) investment, we also 
account for a more direct effect of ER on innovation output. In essence, the coeffi-
cient of Dreg provides a test of the weak version of the PH in the terminology of 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997). 
3.4 Production function 
Finally, we investigate the strong version of the PH by relating ER to la-
bour productivity (LP) via the effects of innovation on the TFP component of 
LP. Again we shall allow the three types of innovations to have synergy ef-
fects. But whereas in the previous sub-section the synergy manifested itself 
in terms of a latent profit function, this time we let the synergy manifest itself 
in terms of TFP.  To this end we estimate an augmented labour-productivity 
(LP) model: 
 
33321 )],,([    tttijk tijkt XkyjyiyILP }),1,0{,,(, kji              (4) 
 
with the first term on the RHS of (4) a short-cut for the set of seven innovation 
combination dummies for the TFP contribution of innovation and besides the 
reference category I(0,0,0). X3t is a set of control variables (including capital-
labour intensities, labour inputs, industry dummies and including the constant 
term) and 3  is a random error term that is assumed to be normally distributed. 
Since the innovation output measures are latent and endogenous, we also have to use 
instrumental variable estimation methods to obtain an unbiased assessment of their 
ex-post contribution to TFP (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002).  
It is possible to test formally the complementarity and substitutability of in-
novation modes for productivity. This can be achieved by applying the super (sub) 
modularity test proposed by Mohnen and Röller (2005). This test is based on super- 
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and sub modularity of the LP equation in terms of the innovation combination 
dummies. If LP is super modular with respect to a combination of innovation 
modes, this is evidence of complementarity between innovation modes. In the case 
of sub modularity, the modes are substitutes.  
For N = 3 we have 8 possible combinations of innovation modes, similar as in 
Polder et al. (2010).  Let Ij denote a possible combination of innovation modes, 
where j = 1,…,8. Note that if  I j  = 1   Ik ( k # j )  = 0.We will use the shorthand f(Ij) to 
denote the value of the LP equation when Ij = 1.6 Super modularity is then defined 
as 
 
)()()()( kjkjkj IIfIIfIfIf   kj,   
 
And likewise, sub modularity is defined as 
 
)()()()( kjkjkj IIfIIfIfIf   kj,   
 
where is the component wise maximum of Ij and Ik, and the component wise 
minimum. We do not need all these inequalities. To test the complementarity be-
tween two innovation modes, we only need to make pairwise comparisons keeping 
the third mode constant. In addition, some inequalities are trivial. For example, for Ij 
=  (0,0,0) and Ik = (1,1,0) we have 
 
f(0,0,0) + f(1,1,0)  < f(1,1,0) + f(0,0,0). 
 
Only the combinations where the minimum and maximum operators lead to 
different combinations than the left-hand sides are non-trivial. Thus, combination Ij  
should have at least one element that is smaller than the corresponding element in Ik, 
and at least one element should be bigger (i.e. at least one innovation mode should 
occur in Ij but not in Ik and vice versa). For testing the complementarity between, 
for example, product (y1) and process innovation (y2) in the three-dimensional 
case, we therefore have Ij = (0,1,D) and Ik = (1,0,D), with D = {0,1}, and the ine-
quality restrictions are: 
 
,0)0,0,0()0,1,1()0,0,1()0,1,0( 000110100010  ffff   
.0)1,0,0()1,1,1()1,0,1()1,1,0( 001111101011  ffff  
 
Similar inequality conditions can be derived for the (conditional) pairwise comparisons of 
the TFP regression coefficients pertaining to other innovation combinations. Furthermore, 
the inequalities for sub modularity are easily obtained by replacing ‘<=’ with ‘>=’.  
Kodde and Palm (1986) derived a Wald test-statistic for testing these inequalities for 
                                                     
6 The contribution of other variables than innovation dummies cancels out and thus can be excluded 
from the exposition 
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regression coefficients.  
For N = 3 },,,,,,,{ 111110101100011010001000    is the vec-
tor of coefficients on the dummies for innovation mode combinations in the aug-
mented T F P  m o d e l . We will apply the Kodde-Palm (Kodde and Palm, 1986) test 
using the IV estimates )( IV of (4). 
4. Data 
We have constructed a comprehensive dataset by linking firm-level data 
(manufacturing only) for 2000 – 2008. These data were sourced from four surveys: 
1) The survey on environmental costs of firms (ECF). The survey covers the years 
2000 – 2008 and beyond. This is one of the most important data sources in this re-
search project. The survey collects (amongst others) data on environmental current 
exploitation costs, two types of environmental investment, environmental subsidies 
and expenses on environmental R&D. Environmental investment other than eco 
R&D can be broken down into “end-of-pipe” investment and investment related to 
the renewing of production processes (so-called “process integrated eco invest-
ment”). Because of the fact that this survey only collects data for manufacturing, our 
empirical analysis will be restricted to this branch of the economy. 
2) The energy use survey (ES), which covers the same period as the ECF Survey. 
This survey collects volume data on energy consumption of different types of energy 
use and these can be  used to construct marginal energy prices at the firm-level after 
linking with the data on energy costs collected in the Production Surveys. As natural 
gas and electricity are the most important energy sources for almost all firms, our 
measures for energy prices will be derived from firm-level data for these two energy 
sources. The data for the two types of energy can be lumped into one measure by 
using weights that reflect the energy content in TJ of each constituent source of en-
ergy. Another interesting contribution of this data source is that it enables the calcu-
lation of the carbon-tax component of (gross) marginal energy prices for gas and 
electricity by using data on the energy price tariff structures (tariff schemes) and the 
tax structure of energy prices for these two types of energy use. For a limited num-
ber of firms we can thus make a distinction between gross marginal energy tariffs 
and the carbon tax component of gross marginal energy tariffs for the two types of 
energy. But this exercise is only possible for the firms sampled in the ES-survey. 
Because of the poor coverage of ES with CIS we face a considerable loss of data 
when trying to account for the carbon-tax component of energy prices as well as for 
ER. We have estimated some eco-investment equations with carbon taxes included, 
but the core models presented in this paper are based on marginal energy prices 
without paying attention to carbon taxes.  
3) The Community Innovation Surveys for 2002-2004, 2004-2006 and 2006-2008. 
This survey is used to obtain data on the various types of innovation adopted, the 
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R&D inputs into (technological) innovation and other variables, such as e.g. the 
dependence on foreign markets, innovation subsidies received from different bodies 
and innovation cooperation. The final edition of CIS can be used to investigate the 
synergies of simultaneously adopting environmental innovations targeted at produc-
tion cost reductions and environmental innovations targeted at decreasing the envi-
ronmental burden of final consumption by creating new user value. Because all 
firms responded to the question on environmental regulation (existing or anticipated) 
this variable can be seen as an important determinant for explaining synergy effects 
among innovations. 
4) The Production Statistics Survey (PS). This survey contains firm-level data on 
gross output, turnover, value added, intermediate inputs and the total energy costs of 
firms. After matching with industry-level deflators, this source can be used to con-
struct different output measures such as value-added and gross-output productivity, 
energy cost shares and profitability.  
 
Table 1a summarizes the coverage of different surveys for manufacturing be-
fore and after data linking and before deleting “item non-response” and/or implausi-
ble values (such as a recorded negative value added). The ECF survey has the high-
est coverage with PS. The ES survey can be considered as the best source for vol-
ume data on energy use and the distinction between marginal energy prices net of 
carbon-taxes and the carbon-tax component of gross marginal energy prices. But its 
match with ECF and PS (which collects data on energy costs and volumes for gas 
and electricity) is rather poor.7 A similar poor match can also be found when linking 
ES to CIS (not shown in the table).  
For this reason we choose not to start with the data that are available after matching 
all four available surveys. Instead we use two separate blocks of data: for the model-
ing of the three types of eco investment (including eco R&D) we use the ECF&PS 
panel and after calculating (gross) marginal energy prices using the data available on 
the volumes of energy use for gas and electricity in the PS survey and the corre-
sponding energy price tariff schemes published by SN. For non-eco R&D innovation 
investment we use the ECF&CIS-panel for distinguishing between eco R&D and 
non-eco R&D.8 Thereafter, the predictions from the innovation investment models 
                                                     
7 These surveys are carried out every year.  
8As CIS collects data on total R&D, only this match enables a distinction between eco - and non-eco 
R&D. 
Table 1a: Sample coverage (manufacturing only) 
 
PS CIS ECF   ES ECF&PS ES&ECF 
ECF&PS
&CIS
 
2002 5751  8782 1647 4246 1207  
2004 4966 2538 7867 1851 3732 1294 1441
2006 4300 2133 7296 1683 3344 1110 1238
2008 3808 2164 7230 1602 3156 989 1289
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are used for modeling the decisions to innovate. At this stage the CIS data are im-
perative, not at least as this is the only source that collects data on the importance of 
ER (either existing or anticipated). Annex A presents a list of the variables that are 
available for assessing the PH in this study. A subset of these variables is used in the 
empirical application.  
Table 1b summarizes some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
models. We restrict the discussion to some interesting results. It is noticeable that 
when the CIS data are merged with the PS and ECF data some variables, such as 
firm size, eco-R&D per employee, eco-investment and eco subsidies received, dis-
play a higher average than before the merging. This is due to the fact that the CIS 
survey uses relatively larger firms.9 The means of the variables that originate from 
the CIS survey do not change very much after merging with other surveys. It can be 
seen that eco-R&D is considerably lower than other (non-eco) R&D investment. The 
share of eco-R&D in total R&D investment expenditure amounts to 30 %. Further-
more, the share of process integrated eco investment in total eco investment (eco 
R&D excluded) is about 44 %. These percentages remain of the same order of mag-
nitude when calculated for the full panel obtained after linking the PS, ECF and CIS 
surveys. Finally, it can be seen that about 31 % of the firms in this panel responded 
to ER, either existing or anticipated. 
A more detailed account of the distribution of some key variables is given in 
table 1c. In general the distributions are very skew, with small values for the bulk of 
firms and relatively few firms with substantial eco R&D or other types of eco in-
vestment. However, it can also be seen that eco investment is relatively more “proc-
ess integrated” if eco-investment is more substantial. Finally, skewness is relatively 
much smaller for the productivity measures used in this study.  
 
 
                                                     
9The main objective of the ES survey is to produce aggregate energy statistics and the distribution of 
energy use is very skewed to the right.    
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Table 1b: Descriptive statistics 
 PS&ECF * CIS ** PS&ECF&CIS ** 
 N Mean std N mean std N mean std 
eco R&D per fte (1000 Euro) 19090 0.094 0.249    3784 0.132 0.395 
non-eco R&D per fte (1000 Euro)  2860 4.190 12.874 2193 4.371 12.312 
eco investment per fte (1000 Euro) 19090 0.190 2.047    3784 0.311 3.745 
employment in fte's 19120 99.0 414.4 5571 115.4 487.7 3784 142.5 340.0 
log marginal energy price per TJ 15042 5.863 0.276    3369 5.852 0.314 
share energy tax (after linking with ES) 4742 0.161 0.103    1427 0.155 0.099 
eco subsidies received (dummy) 19120 0.232 0.422    3784 0.388 0.487 
energy cost share t-2 12311 0.017 0.025    3784 0.017 0.026 
belonging to enterprise group (dummy)    5571 0.560 0.496 3784 0.638 0.481 
engaged in innovation cooperation (dummy)    5571 0.256 0.437 3784 0.307 0.461 
dependent on foreign markets (dummy)    5571 0.719 0.450 3784 0.794 0.404 
subsidies received from local authorities (dummy)    5571 0.053 0.223 3784 0.061 0.240 
subsidies received from government bodies (dummy)    5571 0.234 0.423 3784 0.283 0.451 
subsidies received from EU institutions (dummy)    5571 0.038 0.190 3784 0.046 0.209 
existing and anticipated ER (dummy)    5571 0.267 0.442 3784 0.310 0.463 
share of environmental R&D in total R&D     2860 0.308 0.410 2193 0.274 0.389 
share of process integrated eco investment in total eco investment 9452 0.443 0.361    1694 0.424 0.363 
value added per fte (1000 Euro)       3778 63.7 58.4 
log (TFP)       3571 3.731 0.504 
product innovation adopted (dummy)    5571 0.385 0.487 3784 0.443 0.497 
process innovation adopted (dummy)    5571 0.302 0.459 3784 0.349 0.477 
eco innovation adopted (dummy)    5571 0.385 0.487 3784 0.436 0.496 
          
*  Averages for 2003-2008          
**Averages for 2004, 2006, 2008          
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Table 1c: Distributions for selected variables using ES&CIS&PS sample 
         
 N mean P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P95 
         
eco R&D per fte (1000 Euro) 3784 0.132 0.004 0.009 0.023 0.076 0.115 0.373 
non-eco R&D per fte (1000 Euro) 2193 4.371 0.0 0.0 0.160 1.178 3.636 17.725 
eco investment per fte (1000 Euro) 3784 0.311 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.066 0.861 
energy cost share 3784 0.017 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.018 0.054 
         
share of environmental R&D in total R&D  2192 0.274 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.059 0.363 1.000 
share of process integrated eco investment in total eco investment 1694 0.424 0.0 0.0 0.038 0.361 0.726 1.000 
         
employment in fte's 3784 142.5 15.0 19.0 30.0 70.0 140.0 446,0 
value added per fte (1000 Euro) 3778 63.7 26.3 31.9 40.9 53.2 72.6 133.6 
log (TFP) 3571 3.731 3.012 3.212 3.478 3.730 4.000 4.498 
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5. Discussion of the results 
 We shall present and discuss in turn the estimation of each part of the 
model: the investment equations, the innovation output decisions and the contribu-
tion of innovation to productivity performance. The focus of this paper is on the 
contribution of ER to innovating and the estimation of synergies between environ-
mental innovations and other types of innovations. We postulate that environmental 
investment can be brought into the picture for obtaining a more in-depth analysis of 
the Porter Hypothesis and to account for the response of firms to energy price incen-
tives. We also investigate whether ER has a role to play in the different stages of 
innovation and indirectly on productivity.  
We pool the data for the years 2004, 2006 and 2008. Some of the variables, 
like the innovation choices, refer to a three-year period ending respectively in the 
years just mentioned.  We control for industry effects and year fixed effects (except 
for the investment selection equations). Some of the variables are lagged by one or 
two years to partly circumvent a simultaneity problem. 
5.1 Investment 
The selection and the outcome equations of the investment decisions were es-
timated simultaneously by maximum likelihood using the tobit type II model. The 
results for the probit part of the estimates (see Table 2a) clearly indicate that selec-
tivity is present in the data. At least for non-eco R&D and end-of-pipe eco invest-
ments the correlation coefficients between the error terms in the selection and the 
outcome equations are statistically significant. For non-eco R&D (column 4) we 
have controlled for some of the variables that are usually found in the literature for 
explaining R&D selection: group belonging, dependency on foreign markets, de-
mand pull and cost push considerations. As often reported in the literature, size is a 
significant determinant of the probability to invest in R&D as well as demand pull 
and the dependence on foreign markets. It is fair to say that there is perhaps little 
sense to correct for selection in eco-R&D investment (column 1) as only 24 out of 
5528 observations have no eco-R&D investment. Nevertheless size and the impor-
tance of environmental levies push firms to invest in eco R&D. It is noteworthy that 
environmental regulations lead firms to invest even in non-eco R&D. Other (than 
R&D) eco investments are more frequent in small firms. They seem to be driven by 
the importance of energy in total cost, the burden of environmental levies in total 
exploitation cost and the existence of environmental regulations.  
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Table 2a:  Investment equations (Tobit type II)   
    
 R&D investment  Other eco investment 
      
 eco R&D  non-eco R&D   end-of-pipe  process integrated  
          
N total 5552  2842   5552  5552  
N censored 24  693   3391  3536  
N uncensored 5528  2149   2161  2016  
         
1) Selection coeff. SE coeff. SE  coeff. SE coeff. SE 
          
log(fte) t-2 0.253 0.121 0.192 0.029  -0.055 0.019 -0.082 0.019 
log(energy cost share) t-2 0.132 0.132    0.130 0.021 0.103 0.021 
log(share environmental levies) t-2 0.338 0.074    0.041 0.014 0.062 0.016 
environmental regulation (ER) 0.119 0.366 0.219 0.059  0.192 0.039 0.249 0.039 
firm belongs to enterprise group -0.016 0.061      
firm is dependent on foreign markets 0.449 0.077      
demand pull objective important 0.509 0.060      
cost push objective important -0.256 0.261      
industry dummies yes yes   yes  yes  
time dummies no no   no  no  
          
rho   0.094 0.203 -0.658 0.062  0.686 0.093 -0.068 0.085 
Log likelihood -8054.8  -5103.2   -7485.0  -7237.6  
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Table 2b: Investment equations (Tobit type II, continued) 
          
 R&D investment  Other eco investment 
      
 eco R&D  non-eco R&D   end-of-pipe  process integrated  
          
N total 5552  2842   5552  5552  
N censored 24  693   3391  3536  
N uncensored 5528  2149   2161  2016  
         
2) Outcome: log(investment per fte) ME SE ME ME SE ME  ME SE ME ME SE ME
          
log(fte) t-2 -0.161 0.022 -0.013 0.035  0.013 0.048 0.121 0.055
environmental regulation (ER) 0.066 0.032 0.156 0.065  0.224 0.075 0.129 0.082
log(p_investment/p_energy including tax) t-2 0.693 0.104    0.715 0.215 0.177 0.262
log(energy cost share) t-2  0.072 0.018    0.368 0.042 0.366 0.046
eco subsidies received 0.746 0.059   0.964 0.127 1.021 0.145
firm belongs to enterprise group 0.174 0.072      
firm is dependent on foreign markets 0.356 0.108      
innovation subsidies local authorities 0.271 0.097      
innovation subsidies government bodies 0.600 0.065    
innovation subsidies EU bodies 0.658 0.117    
demand pull objective important 0.226 0.034    
cost push objective important -0.114 0.032    
industry dummies yes yes   yes  yes  
time dummies yes yes   yes  yes  
          
Log likelihood -8054.8  -5103.2   -7485.0 -7237.6
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Table 2b presents the results for the outcome equations of the Heckman selec-
tion (or tobit type II) model for the four types of investment. To save space, we fo-
cus the discussion on the marginal effects (ME) and their standard errors.10 It is of-
ten found in empirical work that R&D per employee is not significantly related to 
size, i.e. it increases proportionately with size. This is also what we find here for 
non-eco R&D and end-of-pipe eco investment. Eco-R&D rises less than proportion-
ately with size. Only process integrated eco investments grow faster than size. Inno-
vation subsidies are positively correlated with all types of investment. For non-eco 
R&D this applies in particular to innovation subsidies received from government 
bodies and the EU. The estimates for eco-subsidies are rather high and this may 
reflect an endogeneity problem: to the extent that some factors that drive eco-
investment also condition eco-subsidies, the marginal effects of eco-subsidies in the 
investment equations are upward biased. Firms that belong to enterprise groups or 
that sell on foreign markets have higher spending in non-eco R&D. Again, this re-
sult corroborates the findings of earlier research. 
Now, let’s turn to our variables of interest: ER and the energy price and cost 
shares. It can be seen that ER is an important driver for the two types of R&D in-
vestments per employee (even non-eco R&D) and for end-of-pipe eco investments. 
Eco-R&D and end-of-pipe eco investments have a price elasticity of around 0.7. 
Only process integrated eco investments are not significantly related to ER and en-
ergy prices. The three types of eco-investments increase with the energy cost shares. 
Thus, already at the investment stage of innovation, there is a role for ER and mar-
ket based environmental instruments such as energy prices and cost considerations 
in explaining differences in investment intensities.  
5.2 The innovation decisions 
The main focus of this paper is on the innovation decisions of firms (i.e. the 
innovation output stage of our “Green CDM” model). Table 3 presents the results 
for the model that uses three types of innovations: 1) product innovation, 2) process 
innovation and 3) eco innovation. We report two types of estimates, those of a tri-
variate probit model (MVP), in which the effects of common unobservable variables 
are captured by correlations between the error terms of the three equations, and a 
simultaneous trivariate probit model with endogenous dummies, our model (3) in-
spired by Lewbel (2007), in which in addition synergies between the three types of 
innovations are estimated.11 The Lewbel MVP model nests the MVP model and is 
preferred to the latter by the likelihood ratio test. We shall therefore base the discus-
sion on the Lewbel MVP estimates. 
 
 
                                                     
10 The coefficient estimates are available upon request. 
11 Because these variables are at the center of interest, we only present marginal effects (ME’s) for the 
four investment types, the regulation variable, size and innovation cooperation. 
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Table 3: Innovation decisions (multivariate probit model with and without endogenous dummies)     
             
 Product innovation (1) Process innovation (2) Eco innovation (3) 
       
 MVP Lewbel MVP MVP Lewbel MVP MVP Lewbel MVP 
             
 ME SE ME a) SE ME SE ME a) SE ME SE ME a) SE 
             
N observations (2002 – 2008) 3793    3793    3793    
             
predicted log(non-eco R&D per fte) 0.497 0.031 0.552 0.032 0.212 0.027 0.142 0.022 0.123 0.032 0.076 0.023 
predicted log(eco R&D per fte) 0.024 0.022 0.048 0.022 0.074 0.021 0.072 0.017 -0.019 0.024 0.032 0.019 
predicted log(end-of-pipe eco investment per fte) 0.016 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.046 0.020 0.041 0.013 0.037 0.023 0.019 0.014 
predicted log(process integrated eco investment per fte) 0.090 0.030 0.121 0.030 0.049 0.029 0.042 0.020 0.064 0.034 0.045 0.022 
environmental regulation 0.301 0.023 0.177 0.026 0.296 0.022 0.088 0.018 0.949 0.030 0.679 0.021 
log(fte) t-2 0.100 0.014 0.108 0.014 0.027 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.024 0.015 0.003 0.009 
innovation cooperation 0.444 0.023 0.421 0.024 0.345 0.021 0.214 0.016 0.207 0.026 0.153 0.018 
industry dummies yes    yes    yes    
year dummies yes    yes    yes    
             
synergy product - and process innovation   0,334 0,038   0,334 0,038     
synergy product - and eco innovation   0,328 0,045       0,328 0,045 
synergy process - and eco innovation       0,398 0,032   0,398 0,032 
rho21 0,279 0,031 0,010  0,279 0,031 0,010      
rho31 0,292 0,037 0,025      0,292 0,037 0,025  
rho32     0,356 0,033 0,078  0,356 0,033 0,078  
             
Log likelihood -4690,3  -6240  -4690,3  -6239,7  -4690,3  -6239,7  
             
a) The rho parameters in the Lewbel models are calculated using “generalized residuals” (see Gourieroux et. al., 1987). 
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All eco-investment inputs seem to contribute to the three types of innovation 
output, except that end-of-pipe investment is insignificant for explaining the deci-
sion to innovate in products and only weakly significant for the decision to innovate 
environmentally. The latter result corroborates the conclusion of Rennings and Rex-
häuser (2010) that the contribution of end-of-pipe investment to dynamic efficiency 
(and in particular product innovation) is limited.  
By contrast, process integrated eco investment seems to contribute to every 
type of innovation output. For product innovation the marginal effect of process 
integrated eco investment even exceeds the contribution of eco R&D investment. By 
contrast, the picture for process innovation output is the other way around. However, 
these differences are minor after taking into account the standard errors of the esti-
mated marginal effects. It can be noticed that the contribution of any type of eco 
investment to the usual innovation outputs considered in the mainstream of the in-
novation literature (i.e. technological product - and process innovation) is relatively 
modest compared to the contribution of non-eco R&D inputs. 
Non-eco R&D remains the most important variable for explaining technologi-
cal innovations even after including eco innovation as a separate type of innovation 
output and after accounting for the three types of eco investment as additional inputs 
into innovation. Non-eco R&D is especially influential for product innovation. Non-
eco R&D investment even contributes to eco innovation output more so than other 
types of investment, although the difference with other types of eco investment is 
rather small compared to the difference in their respective contributions for product 
– and process innovation (technological innovation).   
Our results also show that innovation cooperation increases the incidence  of  
all three types of innovation modes but that size only “matters” for product innova-
tion: its coefficient is insignificant for process and eco innovation output. 
Most interestingly, our results show that environmental considerations influ-
ence the incidence of all three innovation modes. Responses of firms to existing and 
anticipated ER seem to increase the probability of adopting product -, process - and 
eco innovations, as the estimate of the regulation variable is significantly positive 
for any of the three types of innovation output. In particular, the economic signifi-
cance of the contribution of ER to eco innovation output is very sizeable. The pres-
ence of ER increases by 68 percentage points the occurrence of eco-innovation, by 9 
percentage points the occurrence of process innovation and by 18 percentage points 
that of product innovations. In other words, in addition to the indirect effect of ER 
on innovation investment, there is also an important direct effect of ER on the inci-
dence of each of the three types of innovation. We consider this last result as a 
strong corroboration of the weak version of the PH.  
Finally, the estimates clearly point out a synergy between the three types of 
innovation, synergy with respect to a latent profit function. Any type of innovation 
increases the profitability of adopting another type of innovation. In particular, eco 
and non-eco innovations reinforce each other. There is no direction of causality in 
this synergy effects. Eco innovation can take the form of product or process innova-
26 
 
tions, i.e. reduce the environmental impact in producing goods or services or lead to 
new products or services that are less polluting or energy-consuming. Conversely, 
new products or processes often take the form of eco-innovations.12  
5.3 Productivity 
This section looks into the productivity impact of applying different types of 
innovation, in particular eco-innovations, i.e. indirectly it examines the strong ver-
sion of the PH. Because much of the discussion of the PH is concerned with the 
impact of ER on TFP we decided to use (value added) labour productivity (LP) and 
to look at the contributions of different innovation combinations to the (residual) 
TFP component of labour productivity. Do environmental regulations also affect an 
economic performance measure like total factor productivity? 
Table 4_Productivity regressions 
     
Method OLS GMM a) 
     
Dependent variable LP LP 
     
 coeff. SE coeff. SE 
log(K/L) 0.206 0.010 0.202 0.014 
log(L) 0.067 0.034 0.076 0.017 
ecoR&D per fte t-1 0.341 0.065 0.244 0.099 
eco end-of-pipe investment per fte t-1 -0.016 0.008 -0.020 0.012 
eco process integrated investment per fte t-1  -0.014 0.014 -0.022 0.039 
environmental regulation (dummy) 0.016 0.029 0.070 0.063 
d001 0.001 0.042 -0.164 0.165 
d010 -0.130 0.050 -0.602 0.790 
d011 -0.010 0.044 0.462 0.327 
d100 0.082 0.036 0.721 0.370 
d101 0.032 0.039 0.554 0.318 
d110 0.008 0.042 -0.224 0.522 
d111 0.006 0.034 0.051 0.107 
_cons 3,313 0.051 3.259 0.090 
Year dummies yes  Yes  
Industry dummies yes  Yes  
     
R2 0.278    
Wald Chi2   447.9  
P-value Hansen’s J statistics   0.08  
N 2062  2021  
a) Instruments used:  eco R&D per fte in  t-1,  eco end-of-pipe investment per fte in t-1, eco-
process integrated investment in t-1, environmental regulations, year and industry dummies, 
log(age), log(age) squared, innovation propensities, log(K/L) and log(L) one year lagged. 
                                                     
12 The observed frequencies of innovation adoptions are as follows for the sample used in 
table 3: d000=39%, d001=7%, d010=3%, d011=6%, d100=8%, d101=11%, d110=6% and 
d111=20%, where the first index refers to product innovation, the second to process innova-
tion and the third to eco innovation, a zero denoting no innovation and a one the presence of 
innovation. The frequencies are very similar for the sample used in table 4. 
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We first present the results of a simple OLS regression that explains labour 
productivity differences between firms and over time with the help of the innovation 
dummies representing the innovation combinations observed in the data. Besides 
industry and year dummies, the regressions control for the beginning-of-period eco-
investment intensities (i.e. eco-R&D, end-of-pipe eco-investments, and process-
integrated eco-investments), the presence of environmental regulations, the capital-
labour ratio and a scale effect. The residual represents TFP, and therefore the effects 
of eco-investments, environmental regulation and the innovation combination dum-
mies can be interpreted as affecting TFP. 
The OLS estimates presented in table 4 show that there is some evidence of 
modest scale economies: the labour and capital output elasticities add up to 1.076, 
the capital elasticity of output being estimated at 0.2. Eco-R&D exerts a substantial 
positive direct contribution to productivity besides the effect exerted via the innova-
tion dummies included in the models. The direct effect of end-of-pipe eco invest-
ments is negative while the eco process-integrated investments are not significant.  
Environmental regulation does not make a statistically significant difference. 
Among the innovation combinations, only one, innovating in products only (d100), 
affects TFP more than the reference scenario of on innovation.13  
However, a drawback of the OLS estimation is that the innovation dummies 
are not fully exogenous. This assumption contradicts our efforts so far to correct for 
endogeneity in our structural model. We have modelled innovation as a separate 
production process and this makes the exogenous treatment of the innovation dum-
mies implicitly made in the OLS estimation inadequate from a methodological point 
of view. To circumvent these shortcomings we re-estimated the productivity equa-
tion using the GMM instrumental variables (IV) method. The GMM estimation uses 
the predicted propensities derived from the innovation output model as instruments 
in addition to the logarithms of the firms’ age and its square, and the lagged values 
of capital intensity and labour input. The results of the GMM estimation clearly 
show that the endogeneity of the innovation dummies is an important issue. Al-
though the coefficients have different magnitudes, in essence they convey the same 
story. No innovation combination anymore has a statistically higher or lower contri-
bution to TFP than the case of no innovation. Eco-R&D continues to have a positive 
and significant direct effect on TFP whereas the other eco investments and environ-
mental regulation do not have a significant effect. Hence, like the study by Lanoie et 
al. (2011), our results do not support the strong version of the PH. Since no innova-
tion combination increases TFP and since the only direct eco-investment effect on 
TFP goes via eco-R&D, the incidence of which is not affected by ER, we conclude 
that the total effect of ER on TFP is insignificant.    
In order to test for complementarity and substitutability between innovation 
modes in terms of their effects on TFP performance, we need to test the inequality 
restrictions derived in section 3.4.  The Kodde-Palm (1986) test statistics used in the 
                                                     
13All combinations are to be compared with the reference combination (D000), whose contribution is 
included in the constant term of the regressions. 
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Mohnen-Röller (2005) test procedure can be calculated by re-estimating for every 
pair of innovation modes the GMM model under inequality constraints and then 
performing a Wald test of the difference between the constrained and unconstrained 
estimates. We run two types of tests: once we test for the null hypothesis of com-
plementarity and once for the null hypothesis of substitutability.  
 
 
The results reported in Table 5 show that a 5 % level of significance eco in-
novation is complementary, and definitely not substitute, to product as well as to 
process innovation, and that product and process innovations are substitutes and 
definitely not complements. Only the complementarity in the introduction of product 
and process innovations is no longer present when it comes to synergy in reaching 
higher levels of TFP. We hence do not find the crowding-out of technological inno-
vations by environmental innovations that Marin (2012) reported for Italian firms 
using a model similar to ours but patent counts instead of innovation occurrences as 
a measure of innovation output. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents a new attempt to investigate the validity of the Porter hy-
pothesis using a more structural modeling approach than mostly used up to now in 
the mainstream of empirical research on this topic. We apply a “Green type of 
CDM” innovation model to a very comprehensive data set built after matching four 
surveys. The use of detailed data on energy use and energy tariff structures enables 
us to construct marginal energy prices at the firm level. These data and the firm-
level data on several types of eco investments, non-eco R&D investment and re-
sponses to environmental regulations (ER) are used to assess the importance of en-
Table 5 Results for testing super- and sub-modularity using the LP equation 
    
I) H0: complementarity 
    
Combination Product-Process Product-Eco Process-Eco
Kodde-Palm Test Statistics 2,974 0,032 9,409-E-5
    
II) H0: substitutability 
    
Combination Product-Process Product-Eco Process-Eco
Kodde-Palm Test Statistics 5,588E-05 2,930 4,982
    
The lower bound for the Kodde-Palm test for 2 degrees of freedom is 1.642 at 5% level of 
significance and 3.808 at the 10% level of significance. The respective upper bounds are 2.706 
and 5.138. 
The null hypothesis is not rejected if the test statistic falls below the lower bound and is  
rejected if it falls above the upper bound. In between the two bounds the test is inconclusive. 
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ergy price incentives and ER for the different stages of the innovation process con-
sidered in the CDM innovation model. Furthermore, our model tests for the exis-
tence of synergies in the occurrence of, and in the effect on total factor productivity 
(TFP) of product, process and eco innovations.  
Our empirical results strongly corroborate the weak version of the PH. This 
conclusion can be broken down into several parts: 1) besides environmental invest-
ment subsidies and the pre-existing dependence of firms on energy use, marginal 
energy prices (including carbon taxes) are among the most important determinants 
of eco investment 2) there is a significantly positive contribution of  eco investment 
to the propensity of introducing environmental innovations 3) existing or anticipated 
environmental regulations increase the propensity of firms to innovate environmen-
tally but also in products and processes, and 4) the results clearly point to comple-
mentarities in the introduction of product-, process- and eco innovations, and to 
synergy between technological and environmental innovations in reaching higher 
levels of TFP. All this leads to the conclusion that environmental considerations, be 
it in the form of government regulations or in the form of market pressures, seem to 
be an important element in the decision making of firms to invest in R&D and eco 
investments and play a major role in the introduction of different types of innova-
tion, in particular eco innovations.  
However, we cannot conclude anything concerning the strong version of the 
PH, because, on the one hand, the three measures of innovation output do not seem 
to contribute significantly to TFP performance, and hence environmental regulations 
have no indirect effect on TFP, and, on the other hand, the only eco-investment that 
contributes directly to TFP, eco R&D, is not affected by environmental regulations. 
Maybe more time is needed for the effects of environmental regulations to show up 
in economic performances. Future work on dynamic modeling with sufficiently long 
time lags between innovation and productivity might reveal a different picture. 
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Appendix A: List of variables used in this study 
 
a) Data Survey Environmental Costs of Firms (ECF) 
 
hef_to  : total environmental levies (Eu)  
inv_p_t  : environmental investments process integrated (1000 Eu) 
inv_to_t : environmental investments "end-of-pipe" (1000 Eu) 
inv_to  : total environmental investment in current prices (1000 Eu) 
subkl_to : total environmental subsidies received (1000 Eu) 
eco_subs : dummy for eco subsidies >= 5000 Eu  
sh_hef  : share of environmental levies in total environmental  
                            exploitation costs  
sh_proc_inv : share process integrated investment in total environmental  
                            investment  
sh_subs : share environmental subsidies in total environmental costs  
sh_pi_inv : share process integrated investment in total environmental  
                            investment  
pimi  : price deflator total environmental investment  
zrv  : total expenditure on environmental R&D (1000 Eu) 
erd  : environmental R&D in constant prices (1000 Eu) 
ecoinput : environmental innovation input (R&D and investment;  
                           1000 Eu) 
inv_eco : total environmental innovation input in constant prices 
 
b) Data Energy Statistics Survey (ES) 
 
v_aardgas : total volume of gas used (1000 m3) 
v_electra : total volume of electricity used (1000 Kwh) 
prijs_electra : marginal price electricity based on tariff structure electrici- 
                            ty  
prijs_gas : marginal price gas based on tariff structure gas 
mp  : marginal energy prices per TJ  (after converting gas and  
                            electricity in TJ's)  
sh_tax  : share marginal tax in gross marginal energy price 
sh_tax_ex : marginal tax as a percentage of energy prices net of taxes 
mean_tax : mean energy tax per TJ  
 
   Energy data Production Statistics Survey (PS) 
 
pg_mean : unit values gas (Euro/m3) PS 
pe_mean : unit value electricity (Euro/Kwh) PS 
aardgas  : consumption of gas used (1000 Eu) 
electriciteit : consumption of electricity used(1000 Eu) 
uv  : unit values total energy input (Euro per TJ) 
pi_energie : firm-specific price index based on unit values per TJ  
sh_energy : energy cost share (derived from ES and PS) 
 
 
c) Innovation data (CIS) 
 
 1) Inputs into innovation: 
rrdinx  : in-house R&D expenditure in current prices, cen- 
                            sored (1000 Eu) 
rrdexx  : outsourced R&D expenditure in current prices,  
                            censored (1000 Eu) 
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rrd  : total R&D expenditure in current prices, censored  
                           (1000 Eu) 
rtot  : total innovation expenditure in current prices, cen- 
                            sored (1000 Eu) 
non-eco R&D : rrd - zrv (1000 Eu) 
 
 2a) Eco innovation output production related (2006-2008): 
ecomat  : innovation targeted at lower use of materials pup   
ecoen  : innovation targeted at lower use of energy pup   
ecoco  : innovation targeted at lower CO2 emission   
ecosub  : innovation by using less polluting materials   
ecopol  : innovation targeted at less polluting in production  
                            process 
ecorec  : innovation targeted at better recycling etc.  
 
 2b) Eco innovation output consumer related (2006-2008): 
ecoenu  : innovation targeted at less energy use of products  
                            by consumers   
ecopos  : innovation targeted at less polluting in consump- 
                            tion of products   
ecorea  : dummy for innovation targeted at better recycling  
                            by consumers etc.  
 
 3) Eco innovation output (2002-2006): 
emat  : innovation targeted at lower use of energy and  
                            materials   
eenv  : innovation targeted at reducing environmental  
                            impacts of production  
 
 4) Environmental regulation (ER): 
mreg = estd : innovation applied to meet ER(2002-2006) 
  mreg  : innovation applied to meet ER (2006-2008) 
 
 5) Other innovation variables: 
inpdt  : dummy for product innovation, not censored 
inpcs  : dummy for process innovation, not censored 
org  : dummy for organisational innovation, not censored 
formar  : dummy for operating on foreign market or not (not  
                            censored) 
gp  : dummy for belonging to enterprise group or not  
                            (not censored) 
nl  : dummy for head office in NLD or not (not cen- 
                            sored) 
co  : dummy for innovation cooperation with other  
                            firms or not 
funloc  : dummy for received innovation subsidies from lo- 
                            cal authorities 
fungmt  : dummy for received innovation subsidies from  
                            government bodies 
funeu  : dummy for received innovation subsidies from EU 
dp  : dummy for demand-pull objectives important or  
                            not (not censored) 
cp  : dummy for cost-push objectives important or not                          
                            (not censored) 
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d) Production Statistics Survey (PS) 
 
fte  : employment (in full-time equivalent) 
nv  : value of total turnover (1000 Eu ) 
nq  : value of gross output (1000 Eu) 
nm  : value of total intermediate inputs (E + M + S, 1000 Eu) 
va  : value added (nq – nm) 
bedrlst341000 : total cost of energy use (1000 Eu) 
bedrlst310000 : total cost of production (1000 Eu) 
depr  : total depreciation costs (1000 Eu, proxy for capital inputs) 
sh_energy : cost share energy (bedrlst341000/bedrlst310000) 
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Appendix B: The likelihood function for the Lewbel Model 
 
In this appendix we describe the derivation of the likelihood function for our 
empirical application. The computational complexities arise due to the requirement 
to have full error support over all possible combinations (strategy choices). Refer-
ring to equations (3) in the text, there are eight possible combinations of the three 
types of innovation. Thus, for every adopted combination, seven )12( N compari-
sons are at stake. To keep things tractable we will focus on strategy (3a). Adopting 
strategy (3a), no innovation at all (thus all comparisons are against zero profits), 
yields the following set of inequalities: 14   
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322223
23
33222)1,1,0()0,0,0(   dUBUBxxVV   
dUBUBxVV 1111111)0,0,1()0,0,0(                          (B1)               
212122
12
22111)0,1,1()0,0,0(   dUBUBxxVV   
313133
13
33111)1,0,1()0,0,0(   dUBUBxxVV   
231312
3322111)1,1,1()0,0,0(   xxxVV  
            32141432   dUBUB  
 
In (B1) we make a distinction between the deterministic part (indicated by dijUB ) and 
the stochastic part of the right-hand side (RHS). Notice that, for N = 3, we have one 
inequality involving ,3 two involving 2 and four involving .1 Any coherency prob-
lem is lifted if we take  the minimum of the upper bounds of the inequalities on the 
right-hand sides.  
So we replace the inequalities for 2  by ),min( 322212   dd UBUB and similarly 
for the inequalities involving 1 :  
).,,,min( 3214313212111   dddd UBUBUBUB  
 
The (joint) probability for the case of no innovation at all is given by 
 
                                                     
14 We use superscripts to denote the sum of ij  and ji . Thus, .jiijij    
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}0,0,0Pr{ 321  yyy  
),,,min(Pr{ 3214313212111   dddd UBUBUBUB  
      }&),min(& 33322212 ddd UBUBUB    
),,,min(Pr{ 3214313212111   dddd UBUBUBUB  
         }&),min(| 33322212 ddd UBUBUB    
     X  }|),min(Pr{ 33322212 ddd UBUBUB    
     X  }Pr{ 33 dUB . 
 
Similar expressions can be derived for the other combinations of strategies. The 
expressions involve conditioning upon unobservable variables to enable GHK simu-
lation for evaluating the integration bounds in the likelihood function. For example 
for P(0,0,0), the likelihood function is given by 
 
23
)3|322,21min(
2
3
33 )|()( 

dfdf
dUBdUBdUB     
 
,),|( 132
)3,2|3214,313,212,11min(
1 

df
dUBdUBdUBdUB   
 
where f(.) stands for the density function of the normal distribution. 
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